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Introduction
The recent and ongoing spate of teacher strikes in large 
school districts like the Los Angeles Unified School District, 
Oakland Unified, and Denver Public Schools brought the 
inextricable connection between collective bargaining and 
school district budgets to the forefront of public attention. 
After a 6-day strike in early 2019, Los Angeles Unified and 
the local union agreed to a new collective bargaining agree-
ment (CBA) that will cost the district approximately $403 
million over the next 3 years and add an additional $183 mil-
lion to the district’s annual funding deficit, highlighting con-
cerns that the district cannot afford the deal (Swaak, 2019). 
The Los Angeles County superintendent said the new contract 
“continues to move the District toward fiscal insolvency” and 
has threatened to take control of school district finances unless 
the district presents a balanced budget by early spring 2019 
(Swaak, 2019). Similar concerns overshadowed the final con-
tract agreed to in Oakland Unified, which required the school 
board to approve an immediate $20 million in budget cuts to 
avoid fiscal insolvency (Harrington, 2019).
The experiences of school districts confirm what research 
suggests—the content of CBAs plays an important role in 
shaping district finances (Chambers, 1977; Duplantis, 
Chandler, & Geske, 1995; Eberts, 1983; Eberts & Stone, 
1984; Gallagher, 1979; Strunk, 2011). Required or permitted 
in 45 states (Sanes & Schmittt, 2014), collective bargaining 
negotiations establish legally binding contracts that dictate 
workplace procedures that impact every aspect of teachers’ 
work (e.g., teacher compensation, class size, leaves, seniority 
and staffing, the school day and year schedule, and general 
working conditions; Eberts, 2007; Hill, 2006; Strunk, 2012). 
Furthermore, research suggests that CBAs are fairly inflexi-
ble to change (Cowen & Fowles, 2013; Ingle & Wisman, 
2018; McDonnell & Pascal, 1979; Strunk, et al., 2019). Once 
established, contract provisions can only be altered through 
subsequent negotiations, and the working conditions and 
compensation levels ensconced therein are difficult to alter as 
unions and district administrators are resistant to cede ground 
on the protections they have secured. Consequently, the 
financial commitments contained in CBAs can incur costs for 
years after negotiations are complete.
The dynamics of contract negotiations and in particular, 
resulting financial obligations are especially important dur-
ing times of fiscal duress when school districts must reduce 
budgets in response to financial shocks. When state revenue 
streams decrease, for example, during periods of economic 
downturn when income and sales taxes drop (Chakrabarti, 
Livingston, & Setren, 2015; Leachman & Mai, 2014), school 
districts are vulnerable to drastic cuts. This is because in the 
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majority of states, substantial proportions of district reve-
nues now come from state revenue streams (Leachman & 
Mai, 2014); by 2008, at the start of the Great Recession, the 
average district funded nearly half of its operating cost from 
state revenue sources (Evans, Schwab, & Wagner, 2019). 
The ways in which districts cut expenditures and on what 
matter. Prior research suggests that decreases in instruc-
tional-based expenditures as a result of fiscal shocks to 
school districts are associated with lower tests scores and 
lower rates of high school completion (Jackson, Wigger, & 
Xiong, 2018). Consequently, in times of financial duress, 
school districts need the flexibility to allocate scarce 
resources in ways that preserve instructional resources and 
ultimately student learning.
If what districts cut in times of financial duress matters 
for maintaining student learning, then if and how districts 
and unions alter CBAs may also be of prime importance. If 
CBAs are intractable even during times of financial duress, 
then the documents may protect key instructional conditions 
that are important for students, forcing districts to reduce 
expenditures in noncore operational areas (e.g., capital 
improvement projects) before turning to cuts in instructional 
resources. Alternatively, if unions push districts to maintain 
core working conditions for teachers (e.g., salary levels) in 
exchange for changes in contract language more directly 
related to instruction (e.g., school schedule), then CBAs may 
make it more difficult to maintain the integrity of classroom 
instruction as district revenues diminish. While prior 
research suggests that CBAs change very little, no study has 
looked at if and how districts and teachers’ unions alter con-
tractual agreements during times of financial duress.
In this article, we examine how CBAs are renegotiated to 
respond to changing fiscal contexts. We use as our case the 
Great Recession and California school districts. While most 
California districts rely heavily on state funding for their 
operating budgets and thus were severely affected by the 
recession, a subset of California school districts, called Basic 
Aid districts, were largely protected from state budget fluc-
tuations because their local tax revenues exceeded the state-
determined revenue limit. Using Basic Aid districts as a 
comparison group for the majority of districts that faced sub-
stantially diminished revenues during the recession, we 
examine how the content of CBAs, including compensation 
and staffing levels, change during times of fiscal constraint. 
Specifically, we ask: How do (a) CBAs, (b) teachers’ sala-
ries, and (c) pupil-teacher ratios change during times of 
recession-induced fiscal constraint?
We hypothesize that districts that work with their teachers’ 
unions to negotiate CBAs that help alleviate fiscal pressures 
while maintaining instruction will seek flexibility in areas of 
the CBA that have financial implications (e.g., teacher salary 
levels) while leaving instructional priorities protected (e.g., 
instructional time and class sizes) in the contract. To compen-
sate teachers for losses in contractual language with direct 
fiscal implications, provisions that protect teachers’ working 
conditions without increasing district expenditures may be 
enhanced (e.g., teacher transfer procedures, grievance pro-
tections, nonteaching responsibilities). To test these hypoth-
eses and answer our research questions, we use a data set that 
includes measures of the restrictiveness of several critical 
areas of teachers’ union contracts and teacher salaries (nego-
tiated as part of the contracts) from the 2005–2006 and 2011–
2012 school years alongside measures of pupil-teacher ratios 
as a proxy for class size. We estimate a series of difference-
in-difference models, examining contract restrictiveness, sal-
ary, and staffing measures pre- and postrecession for districts 
that were more or less fiscally constrained.
We find that certain areas of the CBAs in districts facing 
financial hardship (i.e., non-Basic Aid districts) became rel-
atively more restrictive after the recession relative to those 
in districts facing fewer budgetary pressures (i.e., Basic Aid 
districts). Contract areas that grew more restrictive include 
provisions governing school days and hours, grievance pro-
cedures, and nonteaching duties. Further, we find evidence 
that fiscally constrained districts reduced the salary of nov-
ice teachers while maintaining salary levels for more experi-
enced teachers. Finally, we find larger class sizes in fiscally 
constrained districts relative to their wealthier Basic Aid 
counterparts after the recession, though these changes may 
result from differences in prerecession trends between the 
two groups. Together, these findings indicate that during 
times of fiscal constraint, districts and teachers’ unions 
negotiate changes in their CBAs that directly reduce expen-
ditures even though they may also have implications for 
instruction and student learning. They compensate teachers 
for these losses by enhancing the contract language sur-
rounding working conditions that have little fiscal impact 
(e.g., teacher assignment, grievance processes, noninstruc-
tional time).
This paper proceeds as follows: In the following sections, 
we set forth a conceptual framework that outlines why and 
how CBAs might be expected to change as a result of eco-
nomic pressures, highlight how the California context pro-
vides an important case for studying how contracts change 
in times of financial duress, outline the data and methods we 
use in our analysis, provide results, and conclude with a dis-
cussion of the implications of our results for how school dis-
tricts navigate future budget shortfalls.
How Might CBAs Change in Times of Financial 
Duress?
District administrators operate their schools within fed-
eral and state funding contexts that dictate the flexibility 
with which administrators can allocate resources according 
to their specific needs. For instance, the federal government 
allocates Title I and other categorical funds that must go to 
targeted student subgroups and activities (U.S. Department 
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of Education, 2015). State governments similarly place 
restrictions on the use of dollars going to districts by estab-
lishing categorical requirements, base salaries for teachers, 
minimum instructional days in the school year and hours in 
the school day, and minimum class sizes, for example 
(Chingos & Blagg, 2017).
It is within these confines that district administrators 
make decisions about the allocation of remaining funds. 
However, even at this local level, administrators are subject 
to constraints in the form of the collectively bargained agree-
ments negotiated with teachers’ unions. CBAs dictate work-
place procedures that impact every aspect of teachers’ work 
and as a result, much of school and district operations (e.g., 
teacher compensation, class size, seniority and staffing, the 
school day and year schedule, teacher evaluations, grievance 
procedures, and other nonteaching duties; Eberts, 2007; Hill, 
2006; Strunk, 2012). Once negotiated, administrators must 
work within these procedures for the duration of the contract 
(ranging usually from 1 to 5 years; e.g., in California, con-
tracts must be renegotiated at least every 3 years). 
Nonetheless, given the strict and largely nonnegotiable fed-
eral and state funding parameters, CBAs offer local school 
districts one of their only opportunities to establish greater 
flexibility in reallocating dollars during times of financial 
duress.
For this reason, we focus our study on the content of 
CBAs and in particular how the regulations within CBAs 
might shift when districts are faced with funding constraints. 
CBAs are made up of hundreds of individual policies, each 
negotiated between district administrators or school boards 
and the local teachers’ unions. A growing literature shows 
that indeed, the policies contained in teacher CBAs are 
linked to school district expenditures (Chambers, 1977; 
Duplantis et al., 1995; Eberts, 1983; Eberts & Stone, 1984; 
Gallagher, 1979; Strunk, 2011). In particular, Eberts (1983), 
Eberts and Stone (1984), and Strunk (2011) found that dis-
tricts expend more money per pupil in school districts where 
teachers’ unions negotiate stronger contracts (defined as 
more restrictive or constraining of district administrators’ 
actions) for their membership. Much of these expenditures 
are directed toward teacher and administrative salary costs 
(Eberts, 1983; Eberts & Stone, 1984; Kleiner & Petree, 
1988; Marianno, Bruno, & Strunk, 2018; Strunk, 2011). 
Given these findings, when districts are subject to external 
financial constraints, whether because state funding formu-
las change, federal funding shifts, or local and state tax rev-
enues decrease in ways that provide districts with fewer 
overall resources, district administrators must reallocate 
resources to live within their newly restricted fiscal realities. 
One obvious place to turn to look for flexibility is the CBA.
CBA policies can loosely be grouped into seven areas of 
regulations: (a) compensation, which incorporates both 
actual salaries for teachers at each “step” (experience level) 
and “lane” (educational credits or credentials) on the salary 
schedule and the policies surrounding compensation such as 
whether bonuses are provided for specific kinds of teachers; 
(b) class size, including not only the maximum number of 
students per class but also what districts must do to compen-
sate teachers if class size maximums are exceeded and by 
when; (c) school day and year schedule, such as the maxi-
mum length of the school day and year and when teachers 
can be on campus; (d) nonteaching duties, which includes 
whether teachers can be asked to take on adjunct duties, the 
amount of duty-free lunch and/or recess time and prepara-
tion time given to teachers each day or week, and require-
ments around the length and frequency of faculty meetings; 
(e) evaluation procedures for both tenured and nontenured 
teachers, including actions to be taken in the case of an 
unsatisfactory evaluation; (f) transfer and vacancy policies 
that dictate how districts can make decisions about which 
teachers can both voluntarily and be involuntarily trans-
ferred between positions and schools; and (g) grievance pro-
cedures, comprised of the process and timeline within which 
grievances must be filed and addressed (see Strunk, 2012, 
for a thorough discussion of the policies contained in these 
agreements and online Appendix A for lists of the specific 
contract provisions we include in each category).
The subareas of the contract can be placed into three over-
lapping categories in regards to the fiscal, instructional, and 
working condition implications that a change to that subarea 
might have on district operations. First, there are policies that 
have substantial financial implications for districts. In particu-
lar, regulations about teachers’ compensation (both actual sal-
ary levels and the policies assigning “extra” compensation for 
specific duties, etc.), class size, and school day and year 
schedule. As district administrators and local teachers’ unions 
renegotiate CBAs, collectively bargained provisions in these 
areas will require districts to reallocate resources. For instance, 
if CBAs require a maximum class size of, say, 22 students in 
grades K–3, then districts must hire more teachers (at the sal-
ary levels outlined in the CBA) to staff the extra classrooms 
and find additional classroom space to house the classes of 
students.
In addition, policies ensconced in the CBAs have direct 
implications for districts’ instructional outcomes. For 
instance, policies governing maximum class size and the 
length of the school day will likely affect student achieve-
ment (Jepsen & Rivkin, 2009; Jez & Wassmer, 2015). 
Similarly, evaluation policies dictated by the CBAs, such as 
on what elements teachers can be evaluated, the frequency 
of observations, and the ways in which observations can be 
conducted, may have direct implications for student out-
comes (e.g., Steinberg & Sartain, 2015; Taylor & Tyler, 
2012).
Importantly, nearly all policies negotiated into CBAs will 
have implications for teachers’ working conditions. Outside 
of compensation and class sizes (frequently discussed as 
teacher working conditions), regulations that dictate teacher 
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evaluations, staffing (transfer and vacancies), grievances, 
the school schedule, and nonteaching duties all provide 
teachers with protections to safeguard their working condi-
tions. For instance, transfer and vacancy regulations can stop 
teachers from being transferred repeatedly after the start of a 
school year and enable more senior teachers to have greater 
discretion in their working assignments. Policies about 
teachers’ noninstructional time can guarantee teachers duty-
free lunches and breaks, constrain the amount of time teach-
ers must be in faculty meetings, lighten their workload by 
restricting the number of preparations they must teach a 
year, and limit the hours they are expected or allowed to be 
on campus. Policies that outline grievance processes provide 
teachers with clear guidelines for how to bring concerns to 
school and district administrators and ensure their rights to 
due process and fair arbitration.
We show how these policies fall into the three outlined 
areas (fiscal, instructional, and working conditions) in Figure 
1. As is made clear in this figure, contract subareas fall into 
more than one of these overlapping circles. Where CBA pro-
visions are situated in this framework should be associated 
with how they are affected during contract negotiations that 
take place during times of fiscal duress. For example, if 
teachers’ unions and administrators in financially con-
strained districts are seeking to relieve pressure on budgets 
while also trying to maintain student learning, they will first 
seek flexibility in those items that have fiscal implications 
and protect to the extent possible policies that will enhance 
instructional outcomes. This includes reductions in teacher 
compensation, which could have long-run effects on the 
ability of the district to attract and retain teachers but per-
haps not immediate short-run impacts on instruction. To 
compensate teachers and teachers’ unions for contractual 
cuts to subareas that have fiscal implications, we may expect 
districts and unions to increase the restrictiveness of nonpe-
cuniary areas that enhance teachers’ working conditions. For 
example, contracts in budget constrained districts might 
grow more restrictive in teacher staffing (transfer and vacan-
cies), grievances, and nonteaching duties. Although we 
assume that unions and districts will work to safeguard poli-
cies with implications for instructional outcomes, secondary 
cuts may come in the way of increasing class sizes as these 
have direct and large implications for immediate fiscal sol-
vency even as they are critical elements of teachers’ working 
conditions and positive contributors to instructional out-
comes. School schedules may become more restrictive to 
improve teachers’ working conditions during times of finan-
cial constraint but potentially in the face of implications for 
student outcomes as instructional time diminishes.
The previous discussion requires the assumption that dis-
trict administrators and local teachers’ unions will work 
together to negotiate CBAs that maintain protections for 
teachers while enabling administrators to make resource 
allocation decisions in line with their fiscal constraints. 
While seemingly innocuous on its face, this belief lies at the 
core of current debates about the role of teachers’ unions in 
American education. In particular, supporters of teachers’ 
unions taking an active role in local policy setting through 
collective bargaining argue that local unions, as the repre-
sentatives of the educators who serve the students in the 
local context, will know best where excess can be trimmed 
and what must be preserved to maintain a strong and instruc-
tionally focused schooling environment for children (Bascia, 
1994, 2005; Kerchner, Koppich, & Weeres, 1997). In con-
trast, however, are those who believe that teachers’ unions 
are “rent-seeking” and will negotiate in the best interest of 
teachers even if those interests do not provide direct benefits 
to students (e.g., Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hoxby, 1996; Moe, 
2011). Indeed, debates about the wisdom of recent teachers’ 
unions’ strikes in Los Angeles, Oakland, Denver, and 
Chicago center around the divergent beliefs that teachers’ 
unions should or should not be allowed to dictate how 
resources are allocated through their collective bargaining 
negotiations during times of fiscal constraint. But, as in most 
debates surrounding teachers’ unions, these disputes are 
largely devoid of any empirical evidence and instead rely 
solely on ideological beliefs about education governance 
(Strunk, Cowen, & Goldhaber, 2018).
To begin to provide some evidence to ground the debate, 
we examine how teachers’ unions and their local district 
partners negotiate CBAs in times of severe fiscal constraint. 
In particular, we consider the restrictiveness of CBAs, which 
we define, following the literature, as the extent to which 
areas of the CBAs constrain district administrators’ opera-
tional flexibility in managing their districts. Before delving 
too deeply into the ways in which we measure the outcomes 
of contract negotiations, we first discuss how California pro-
vides a case in which to empirically test how CBAs change 
in the face of financial constraint.
California in the Great Recession: A Case to Test 
Response to Fiscal Constraint
The Great Recession in California provides a case through 
which we can study how unions and district administrators 
and in particular how the contracts negotiated between the 
two parties respond in times of financial duress. The Great 
Recession officially spanned from December 2007 to June 
2009 and was characterized by high unemployment rates, a 
substantial decrease in consumer spending, and considerable 
reductions in local and state tax revenues (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2012, 2014; Gordon, 2012; National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2010). California was hit relatively 
hard by the Great Recession, boasting joblessness rates over 
10% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Like other states, 
California also experienced severe budget cuts, including in 
education spending, and as elsewhere, these cuts extended 
beyond the formal end of the Great Recession. For instance, 
5spending per student in California was 13.8% lower in 2014 
relative to prerecessionary spending levels, with the state 
spending $873 less per student than it did in 2008 (Leachman 
& Mai, 2014). Estimates further suggest that approximately 
20,000 educators lost their jobs because of the recession in 
the 2011–2012 school year alone (Resmovits, 2013)
However, not all districts were similarly impacted by the 
recession. While most school districts in California receive 
the majority of their funds from state sources, a select group 
of districts benefit from significant local property tax reve-
nues beyond the state revenue limit. This revenue disquali-
fies these districts from receiving general state funding. 
These districts, termed Basic Aid or excess tax districts, fund 
anywhere between 100% to more than 400% of the state rev-
enue limit in local property taxes (Weston, 2013). Basic Aid 
districts tend to be smaller in size and are located in wealthy 
areas with high property values. In California, these districts 
are largely concentrated in the coastal and mountainous 
regions of the state (Weston, 2013).
Given that Basic Aid districts are not as dependent on 
state funding, they are better equipped to maintain revenue 
and expenditure levels during recessionary periods. Figure 2 
shows total per pupil revenue for Basic Aid (BA) districts 
(red dash line with square markers) and non–Basic Aid 
(NBA) districts (blue solid line with square markers) from 
2004 to 2012.1 We see that as expected, BA districts had 
higher revenues throughout the time under study. In both 
types of districts, total revenues gradually increased in the 
years leading up to the recession. When the recession hit in 
late 2007, NBA revenues leveled off and then declined in 
2010. In contrast, BA revenues continued to increase gradu-
ally until 2009, decreasing very slightly in 2010 and 2011. 
Figure 2 demonstrates that expenditures follow similar pat-
terns (expenditures lines have triangle markers).
These differences in revenue and expenditure patterns 
during and after the Great Recession suggest that we might 
expect differential changes in the restrictiveness of subareas 
of these districts’ CBAs over that time period. Simply, the 
substantial decline in revenue levels for NBA districts rela-
tive to BA districts suggests that NBA districts were more 
likely to be forced to make difficult budgetary decisions dur-
ing and after the Great Recession, whereas BA districts were 
less impacted by the recession altogether.
As discussed in the second section (“How Might CBAs 
Change in Times of Financial Duress?”), districts looking to 
make budget reductions will need to negotiate increased 
flexibility into their CBAs in areas with financial implica-
tions for districts and may in exchange, negotiate greater 
protections for teachers in other areas of the contracts. In 
particular, following from Figure 1, we hypothesize that 
tightened budgets may cause particularly financially 
strapped districts (i.e., NBA districts relative to BA districts) 
FIGURE 1. Framework for collective bargaining agreement changes during times of financial duress.
6to pay specific attention to areas of the CBA with financial 
implications for district operations. They may do this by 
lowering compensation for teachers by decreasing salaries 
or salary returns to experience, increasing class sizes, and 
reducing the number of instructional days and hours. 
Contract areas with little direct financial implication for dis-
tricts but that improve teachers’ working conditions may be 
impacted in the opposite direction as districts and unions 
bargain for enhanced worker protections to compensate for 
diminished salaries and increased class sizes.
Data
Outcome Measures
We focus our analysis on 11 separate outcome measures, 
which we describe in detail in this section: the restrictive-
ness of seven separate subareas of the CBAs, three measures 
of teachers’ salaries, and district pupil-teacher ratio, which 
proxies for average district class size. In this article, we 
focus on the CBAs in place in 2005–2006 and therefore 
negotiated before the Great Recession and CBAs in place in 
2011–2012, which either were negotiated during the Great 
Recession or directly thereafter, when districts were still 
impacted by recessionary budget cuts.2 Following earlier 
work (e.g., Koski & Horng, 2007; Marianno & Strunk, 2018; 
Strunk, 2011; Strunk & Grissom, 2010; Strunk & McEachin, 
2011; Strunk & Reardon, 2010; Strunk et al., 2019), we 
include in our sample CBAs from school districts with four 
or more schools because many smaller districts have quite 
different contracts than larger school districts and will react 
to recessionary pressures differently than larger districts.3,4 
We collected CBAs from school districts by first download-
ing available CBAs from district websites. If the documents 
were not available on the websites, we emailed and then 
mailed public data requests to district human resources per-
sonnel and superintendents.
Subarea contract restrictiveness. Following Strunk and 
Reardon (2010), we create and analyze separate measures 
for seven subareas of the CBAs in both the pre- and post-
years of analysis. These subareas represent the major policy 
sections of CBAs in California—compensation, class size, 
school days and hours, evaluation, grievances, nonteaching 
duties, and transfer and vacancy—and allow us to explore 
the tradeoffs in contract language made by unions and dis-
trict administration during times of financial duress. Our 
measures of subarea CBA restrictiveness are developed from 
close content analysis of the collected CBAs. A reliable and 
valid measure of contract restrictiveness or strength should 
evaluate the degree to which a CBA constrains administra-
tors’ actions while taking into account the reality that not all 
provisions included in CBAs actually restrict administra-
tors—some constrain teachers, as well. Following the extant 
literature (e.g., Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014; Gold-
haber, Lavery, Theobald, D’Entremont, & Fang, 2013; 
Strunk, 2011, 2012; Strunk & Grissom, 2010; Strunk & 
McEachin, 2011; Strunk & Reardon, 2010), we create such a 
FIGURE 2. Trends in per pupil revenues and expenditures.
Note. The vertical dotted-dash lines show the pre (2005–2006) and post years (2011–2012) used in this study. The vertical dashed lines show the beginning 
and ending years of the recession (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).
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measure using an adaptation of the partial independence 
item response (PIIR) model developed by Reardon and 
Raudenbush (2006) and first applied to measuring the 
strength of CBAs by Strunk and Reardon (2010).
The PIIR model is a generalized hybrid of a discrete time 
hazard model and a Rasch model that adjusts for the condi-
tional structure of “response” patterns in a CBA. The PIIR 
model measures the underlying latent restrictiveness of 
teachers’ union contract subareas using individual regula-
tions found within the subareas. The model is estimated as a 
multilevel random effects logistic regression with contract 
items nested within contracts, predicting the likelihood that 
a given provision is included in a contract, dependent on the 
inclusion of an earlier contract provision and as a function of 
some latent level of subarea contract restrictiveness.
The model is formally estimated as follows: Let Y
kig
 equal 
the outcome (0, 1) of each item k in contract-year i in district 
g and h
kig
 represent the presence of the gate item for provi-
sion k in contract i in district g so that 
ϕkig kig kigPr Y h= = =( | )1 1 . The gate item represents the 
conditional structure of CBAs, where the presence of a given 
item in a CBA subarea (in each year) is dependent on a 
higher order item being represented. For example, in the 
evaluation subarea of a contract, a contract can only specify 
the length of informal observations of tenured faculty mem-
bers when it first stipulates that informal observations of ten-
ured faculty members are allowed to take place. Thus, ϕkig  
is the conditional probability of a positive response to item k 
for contract-year i in district g, conditional on passing 
through the gate item h
kig
, where h
kig
 is equal to 1 when the 
gate item is represented in the CBA in a given year (Strunk 
& Reardon, 2010).
The structural model then takes the following form:
 log D
kig
kig
ig
j
K
j jig i
ϕ
ϕ
θ γ τ
1
1
−








= + +
=
∑ ,  (1)
where the conditional probability of provision k appearing in 
contract-year i in district g is a function of θig , or the latent 
subarea restrictiveness of CBA-year i in district g, γ j , 
which is the coefficient on a vector of dummy variables for 
each contract item (D
jig
) and represents the conditional 
restrictiveness of each item, and a year random effect, τi , 
which captures subarea restrictiveness in each year apart 
from the subarea-year specific restrictiveness measure. In 
sum, the model is estimating the log likelihood that a given 
contract provision is included in the CBA, conditional on the 
gate contract provision being included and as a function of 
latent subarea contract restrictiveness
In previous cross-sectional work, θi  represented the 
latent level of CBA subarea restrictiveness in a given year. 
Here, θig  is the latent subarea restrictiveness in a given con-
tract-year within a given district, g, and τi  is the subarea 
restrictiveness associated with just each year. To accurately 
capture the overall subarea restrictiveness of a contract in a 
given year, then, we now capture and add the contract/nego-
tiation year random effect back to the estimated latent sub-
area restrictiveness ( θig + τi ) to obtain the total subarea 
restrictiveness of a contract that district administrators expe-
rience in each individual year.5
Teacher salaries. We also take from the coded CBAs three 
measures of teachers’ salaries: teachers’ salaries at the begin-
ning of their careers (base salary), at the end (the highest 
salary for teachers with 20 years of experience), and average 
salary returns to experience. The average salary returns to 
experience for school district i in year t is calculated as:
it
it it=
(Max Salary at 20 years) - (Base Salary)
20
.  (2)
We examine teachers’ salaries and yearly returns to expe-
rience apart from other CBA policies surrounding compen-
sation (and outlined in online Appendix Table A1) because 
teacher compensation is a critical driver of district expendi-
tures and thus will be an important area for negotiation dur-
ing times of fiscal duress. Because teacher salaries in 
California are almost always negotiated in a typical salary 
schedule based on experience and educational credits 
(Strunk, 2011, 2012), novice teachers’ and veteran teachers’ 
salaries do not always move in concert, and districts and 
unions may negotiate different salary increases (or decreases) 
for teachers at various points in the experience distribution. 
Median voter theory, which has frequently been applied to 
the discussion of union representation of members (e.g., 
Kaufman & Martinez-Vazquez, 1990), suggests that unions 
will negotiate in the best interest of their median member. In 
the case of experience, the median teacher in the average 
district in our sample has approximately 13 years of experi-
ence, suggesting that unions may be more likely to privilege 
the maintenance of salary levels for more experienced teach-
ers and returns to experience rather than base salaries for 
novice teachers. Summary statistics for the three salary mea-
sures are also provided in Table 1.
Pupil-teacher ratio. Last, we generate a measure of average 
district pupil-teacher ratio to proxy class size. This measure 
is the total enrollment divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent teachers employed by the district, both of which 
are taken from the National Center for Education Statistics’s 
Common Core of Data (CCD) data set. We provide sum-
mary statistics for the pupil-teacher ratio in Table 1.
District Characteristics
We obtain the district demographic data used as indepen-
dent variables in our models from the CCD and the California 
Department of Educations’ (CDE) public access data sets. In 
π
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related to contract restrictiveness (e.g., Strunk, 2012), includ-
ing enrollment, urbanicity (urban, rural, suburban), level (ele-
mentary, high school, and unified district), and aggregate 
student characteristics such as the percentage of free and 
reduced-price lunch students. In addition, we examine district 
revenue and expenditure data. We lag each variable by 1 year 
in our models because the previous year’s characteristics are 
more likely to influence contract strength than the current year 
(Strunk, 2011; Strunk & McEachin, 2011). Table 2 presents 
these summary statistics for NBA and BA districts in the 
2005–2006 school year. In addition, because the National 
Education Association (NEA) bargains approximately 96% of 
the CBAs in California, we control in our models for any het-
erogeneity in contract restrictiveness related to the unique bar-
gaining structure of the NEA. The state teachers’ union groups 
school districts into 26 service center council districts through-
out the state. The NEA staffs these service centers with person-
nel to coordinate local member efforts in bargaining and 
political activity, and previous work has shown important spill-
over effects occurring in CBAs negotiated within the same ser-
vice center (Goldhaber et al., 2014; Strunk et al., 2019).
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Full Sample, Non–Basic Aid, and Basic Aid Districts on Contract Restrictiveness, Subarea Restrictiveness, 
Salary, and Pupil-Teacher Ratio Measures (2005–2006, 2011–2012)
2005–2006 school year 2011–2012 school year ∆ 2005–2006 to 2011–2012
 
NBA
(n = 384)
BA
(n = 22) NBA – BA
NBA
(n = 384)
BA
(n = 22) NBA – BA
∆ NBA
(n = 384)
∆ BA
(n = 22) NBA – BA
 
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD) Difference
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD) Difference ∆ ∆ DiD
Compensation 0.00
(0.18)
0.10
(0.24)
+ 0.00
(0.16)
0.13
(0.15)
*** −0.01 0.03 −0.04
Class size 0.04
(0.23)
0.05
(0.28)
−0.03
(0.23)
−0.01
(0.28)
−0.08*** −0.06 −0.02
School days −0.03
(0.09)
−0.04
(0.09)
0.08
(0.09)
0.04
(0.07)
* 0.11*** 0.08** 0.03+
Evaluation −0.01
(0.34)
0.07
(0.35)
0.02
(0.36)
0.03
(0.37)
0.04 −0.04 0.08
Grievances −0.32
(0.13)
−0.33
(0.14)
0.15
(0.13)
0.10
(0.14)
+ 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.05+
Nonteaching duties −0.08
(0.11)
−0.05
(0.12)
0.07
(0.09)
0.04
(0.11)
0.15*** 0.10** 0.05+
Transfer and vacancy 0.07
(0.26)
0.06
(0.23)
0.04
(0.28)
0.05
(0.27)
−0.03 −0.01 −0.01
Salary Measures
NBA
(n = 283)
BA
(n = 17) NBA – BA
NBA
(n = 283)
BA
(n = 17) NBA – BA
NBA
(n = 283)
BA
(n = 17) DiD
Base salary 41,850.57
(4,569.91)
45,309.08 
(4,051.96)
** 41,518.65
(4,137.41)
46,307.65
(4,939.66)
*** −331.92 998.57 −1,330.49**
MA salary with 20 
years
78,769.45
(7,223.54)
87,936.66 
(5,569.10)
*** 74,636.09
(8,254.05)
87,216.13
(8,629.24)
*** −4,133.36*** −720.53 −3,412.83+
Average salary return 
on experience
1,849.46
(307.35)
2,131.38 
(217.78)
*** 1,651.93
(328.91)
2,045.42
(389.649)
*** −197.53*** −85.96 −111.57
Other
NBA full
(n = 384)
BA
(n = 22) NBA – BA
NBA full
(n = 384)
BA
(n = 22) NBA – BA
∆ NBA
(n = 384)
∆ BA
(n = 22) DiD
Pupil-teacher ratio 21.11
(1.94)
18.39
(2.44)
*** 23.60
(2.52)
19.93
(3.00)
*** 2.49*** 1.54+ 0.95**
Note. The first two difference columns present results from two-sample t tests comparing group contract restrictiveness, subarea restrictiveness, and salary 
means for Non–Basic Aid (NBA) and Basic Aid (BA) districts in 2005–2006 and 2011–2012. The significance column tests the mean change on each out-
come for BA and NBA districts separately from 2005–2006 and 2011–2012. The final difference column tests the unadjusted difference in these differences 
(DiD), or the difference in the group mean change on each outcome from 2005–2006 and 2011–2012 for NBA and BA districts.
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
9“Treatment”: Basic Aid Designation
We obtain information about the BA designation of 
California school districts in each year from the CDE’s 
School Fiscal Services Division’s Annual Supplemental 
Taxes Report. In California in 2005–2006, 8% of school 
districts were categorized as BA districts, relative to 13% 
in 2011–2012. Because BA districts are generally smaller 
(Weston, 2013), many BA districts have fewer than four 
schools, removing them from our sample. We are left 
with 22 BA districts in 2005–2006 and 2011–2012 (67% 
of all BA districts with four or more schools across the 2 
years).
Tables 1 and 2 assess the comparability of the “treated” 
NBA and “untreated” BA districts in the pre-period as well 
as in the post-recession timeframe. Although Table 1 
shows no significant differences between NBA and BA 
districts on the CBA restrictiveness measures in 2005–
2006, we do find pre-year differences in salary and pupil-
teacher outcomes. Table 2 also shows that NBA districts 
tend to be larger in size and more diverse and enroll more 
impoverished students than their BA counterparts. 
Furthermore, as already shown in Figure 1, NBA districts 
generate less revenue and consequently expend less per 
pupil than BA districts. Although these results are not sur-
prising (e.g., because BA districts are substantially wealth-
ier, they can pay teachers more and have smaller classes), 
these pre-year differences could be symptomatic of a 
larger issue—that NBA and BA districts are different in 
salary and class size trends that would bias the difference-
in-difference estimates. We return to this discussion at the 
end of the “Methods” section, when we highlight specifi-
cation tests performed to assess potential bias.
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics for Non–Basic Aid and Basic Aid Districts on Independent Variables (2005–2006, 2011–2012 school years)
2005–2006 school year 2011–2012 school year
 
NBA
(n = 384)
BA
(n = 22) NBA – BA
NBA
(n = 384)
BA
(n = 22) NBA – BA
 
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD) Difference
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD) Difference
Elementary district 0.319 0.455 0.319 0.455  
Unified district (reference) 0.589 0.409 + 0.589 0.409 +
High district 0.092 0.136 0.092 0.136  
Urban district 0.268 0.364 0.266 0.364  
Suburban district (reference) 0.646 0.591 0.620 0.591  
Rural district 0.086 0.045 0.115 0.045  
% White 0.397
(0.249)
0.610
(0.170)
*** 0.339
(0.236)
0.531
(0.207)
***
% Black 0.053
(0.065)
0.021
(0.015)
*** 0.044
(0.056)
0.017
(0.012)
***
% Hispanic 0.403
(0.256)
0.195
(0.165)
*** 0.463
(0.255)
0.232
(0.168)
***
% Asian 0.105
(0.126)
0.134
(0.101)
0.107
(0.130)
0.144
(0.117)
 
% FRL 0.432
(0.252)
0.175
(0.168)
*** 0.273
(0.199)
0.134
(0.121)
***
Enrollment 13,035.210
(39,054.020)
5,298.636
(5,034.980)
*** 12,733.350
(35,725.850)
5,662.636
(5,099.505)
***
Per pupil revenue (in 2012 dollars) 10,808.060
(2,979.434)
14,120.550
(3,102.641)
*** 10,360.500
(6,960.751)
14,914.480
(4,872.322)
***
Per pupil expenditures (in 2012 dollars) 11,100.010
(3,172.718)
14,982.350
(4,193.639)
*** 10,359.640
(7,240.017)
1,6030.550
(4,701.634)
***
Local per pupil revenues (in 2012 dollars) 3,895.63
(2,394.09)
11,545.42
(2,859.77)
*** 3,980.605
(5,211.444)
12,793.850
(4,673.439)
***
Note. The difference column presents results from two-sample t tests comparing group means on key independent variables. NBA = Non–Basic Aid; BA 
= Basic Aid; FRL = free/reduced-price lunch.
+p < .10. ***p < .001.
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Methods
Research Question 1: How Do CBAs Change During Times 
of Recession-Induced Fiscal Constraint?
To answer our first research question, we estimate a series 
of difference-in-difference (DiD) models comparing CBA 
subarea strength in BA versus NBA districts pre- versus 
post-recession. We use districts’ BA designation taken from 
2005–2006, the base year of our analyses. The DiD models 
take the following general form:
Y T N T N Xit t i t i it it it= + + + ( ) + + +α β γ δ η ω ε* ,  (3)
where Yit  represents one of the seven CBA subarea out-
comes of interest: (a) compensation policies, (b) class size 
policies, (c) school days and hours, (d) evaluation, (e) griev-
ances, (f) nonteaching duties, and (g) transfer and vacancies. 
α is a constant term, Tt  is a time indicator that notes the time 
period (0 in 2005–2006 and 1 during the recession-impacted 
period, 2011–2012), Ni  is an indicator for a NBA district 
that connotes “treatment” as a district susceptible to fiscal 
constraint, Xit  is a vector of time-varying district-level 
covariates, ωit  is an NEA service center fixed effect, and ε it  
is a random error term. δ is the DiD estimate of the treatment 
effect. Results from these models are shown in Table 3.
Research Question 2: How Do Teacher Salaries Change 
During Times of Recession-Induced Fiscal Constraint?
To answer our second research question, we estimate 
three DiD models that exactly follow Equation 3. Rather 
than Yit  representing the restrictiveness of CBA subareas, it 
instead denotes one of three salary outcomes of interest: (a) 
teachers’ negotiated salaries at the beginning of their careers, 
at the first step and lane of the salary schedule (base salary); 
(b) teachers’ negotiated salaries at the end of their careers 
(the highest salary for teachers with 20 years of experience 
and a master’s degree); and (c) average salary returns to 
experience over a teacher’s career. Results are provided in 
Table 4.
Research Question 3: How Do Pupil-Teacher Ratios 
Change During Times of Recession-Induced Fiscal 
Constraint?
Because we derive CBA subarea restrictiveness and sal-
ary measures from the coded CBAs themselves, we only 
have these measures in one pre- and in one post-recession 
period, necessitating the use of a relatively simple DiD. 
However, because our pupil-teacher ratios are generated 
from a longitudinal panel of district-level data, we are able 
to specify a more flexible (and therefore more informative) 
difference-in-difference model that takes the form of an 
event study, showing the relationship between “treatment” 
(NBA status) and student-to-teacher ratio in each of the 
years before, during, and after the recession (e.g., 
Gershenson, 2016; Simon, Soni, & Cawley, 2017). This 
model takes the following form:
Y N Xit i it it it= + + + + +α τ τ δ η ω εt t * ,  (4)
where the outcome Yit  is now the average pupil-to-teacher 
ratio in district i in year t. α is a constant term, and τt  is a 
series of year indicators (i.e., year fixed effects) for each 
year in our panel from 2003–2004 through 2011–2012. Pre-
recession years are 2003–2004 through 2006–2007, during 
recession years are 2007–2008 through 2010–2011, and we 
have our single post-recession year in 2011–2012. Because 
our other CBA measures come from 2005–2006, we use 
2005–2006 as our pre-recession reference year. Ni  is again 
an indicator for NBA district that connotes “treatment” as a 
TABLE 3
Difference in Difference Models Comparing Pre/Post-Recession Contract Restrictiveness for Non–Basic Aid Versus Basic Aid Districts
Compensation
(1)
Class size
(2)
School days 
and hours
(3)
Evaluation
(4)
Grievances
(5)
Nonteaching 
duties
(6)
Transfer and 
vacancy
(7)
Non–Basic Aid in 2005–2006 −0.034
(0.051)
0.035
(0.062)
−0.007
(0.021)
−0.048
(0.084)
0.016
(0.032)
−0.016
(0.029)
−0.030
(0.049)
Post (reference = pre) 0.033
(0.037)
−0.056
(0.035)
0.076***
0.018)
−0.046
(0.043)
0.424*** 
(0.020)
0.096*** 
(0.024)
−0.020
(0.064)
Non–Basic Aid in 2005–2006 
× Post
−0.029
(0.038)
−0.015
(0.036)
0.036*
(0.018)
0.071
(0.046)
0.043*
(0.021)
0.055*
(0.025)
−0.013
(0.066)
Note. The bottom row includes the difference-in-difference estimates. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. The interaction between Non–Basic 
Aid and the posttreatment indicator in Column 1, for example, is interpreted as the change in average compensation contract restrictiveness for Non–Basic 
Aid districts post-recession, subtracting out the change in average compensation contract restrictiveness for Basic Aid districts pre- and post-recession. All 
models control for student enrollment (ln) and the percentage of free and reduced-price lunch students, district location (urban, rural, suburban), district type 
(elementary district, high school district, unified district), and California Teachers’ Association service center.
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
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district susceptible to fiscal constraint. The pre-recession 
interactions provide evidence on whether pupil-teacher 
ratios in NBA versus BA districts were different pre-reces-
sion. We would expect very few differences in pre-recession 
years and large differences during and after the recession as 
NBA districts negotiate with unions to increase class sizes to 
cut costs. All other variables remain as in Equation 3. Results 
from these models are presented in Table 5. In our discussion 
answering these three research questions, we discuss a result 
as statistically significant if it has a p value of .05 or lower.
Limitations
Our study suffers from at least three limitations. First, our 
analysis is likely underpowered due to the large ratio of 
treated NBA districts to the small number of comparison BA 
districts with collective bargaining agreements in our data 
set. When we run power analyses and set our minimal detect-
able effects size at 0.036 and 0.055 units (which, as will be 
seen in the following, are the smallest and largest effect sizes 
we detect in our significant regressions on our subarea con-
tract restrictiveness outcomes), we find that the probability 
that we will reject the null hypothesis on a true effect of 
0.036 is 41% at α = .05. The probability that we will reject 
the null hypothesis on a true effect of 0.055 is 72% at α = 
.05. Although both fall below the 80% threshold and quickly 
drop further when we constrain our sample sizes further, we 
are still better powered than most studies in economics, 
which report a median statistical power of 18% (Ioannidis, 
Stanley, & Doucouliagos, 2017).
Second, we are unable to completely rule out that the 
observed differences between NBA and BA in the restrictive-
ness of CBA subareas or salary levels after the recession are 
due to pre-trend differences. We would ideally like to compare 
how CBA restrictiveness, salaries, and pupil-teacher ratios 
were changing in both NBA and BA districts in the years 
before our analysis timeframe. Our event study specification 
enables this for pupil-teacher ratios. Unfortunately, we do not 
have CBA restrictiveness and salary measures before the 
2005–2006 school year. Online Appendices B and C discuss in 
more detail how we attempt to mitigate concerns regarding 
discrepancies in pretreatment trends and differences in our 
treatment and control groups. Overall, we view our analysis as 
a necessary first step but not altogether sufficient in firmly 
establishing how school districts and unions work together to 
alter CBAs following shocks to school district finances.
Finally, as with any study that uses a single state (or dis-
trict) as a case, our study is limited to districts in California 
and relies on California’s unique school finance and union 
bargaining strength context. In addition, the data are derived 
from one of the worst economic downturns in California his-
tory. Consequently, this study should be viewed as one piece 
of information about CBA responses to fiscal constraint and 
should not be broadly generalized to other state contexts or 
less severe financial shocks. Rather, these results speak to 
what strong unions and school districts prioritize at the bar-
gaining table in times of deep financial duress with implica-
tions for how districts in strong union states might navigate 
large financial troubles in the future.
Results
How Do CBAs Change During Times of Recession-Induced 
Fiscal Constraint?
Table 3 presents the DiD interaction coefficients (bottom 
row) from our estimation of Equation 3 for the main sample of 
treated NBA districts in comparison to the 22 BA districts. 
These coefficients provide estimates of the difference in aver-
age contract restrictiveness post-recession for NBA districts 
relative to BA districts in comparison to pre-recession 
TABLE 4
Difference in Difference Models Comparing Pre/Post-Recession Salary for Non–Basic Aid Versus Basic Aid Districts
Base salary
(1)
MA salary with 20 
years of experience
(2)
Average salary return 
on experience
(3)
Non–Basic Aid in 2005–2006 −2,489.864*
(1,021.633)
−9,238.036***
(1,601.300)
−332.435***
(64.392)
Post (reference = pre) 1,021.407*
(412.987)
−719.952
(1,879.738)
−86.992
(91.711)
Non–Basic Aid in 2005–2006 × Post −1,270.446**
(474.391)
−3,118.718
(1,921.609)
−99.495
(93.761)
Note. The bottom row includes the difference-in-difference estimates. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. Teacher salaries were inflation 
adjusted to 2012 dollars. The interaction between Non–Basic Aid and the posttreatment indicator in Column 1, for example, is interpreted as the change in 
average base salary for Non–Basic Aid districts post-recession, subtracting out the change in base salary for Basic Aid districts pre- and post-recession. All 
models control for student enrollment (ln) and the percentage of free and reduced-price lunch students, district location (urban, rural, suburban), district type 
(elementary district, high school district, unified district), and California Teachers’ Association service center.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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outcome levels, controlling for common factors that impacted 
both NBA and BA districts over the observation time period. 
We find that CBAs in districts that face substantial financial 
constraints (NBA districts) appear to grow more restrictive in 
three of the seven subareas under study, school days and hours 
(Column 3), grievance (Column 5), and nonteaching duties 
(Column 6), relative to changes over the same time period in 
less constrained (BA) districts. Notably, both NBA and BA 
CBAs in these subareas become more restrictive, but NBA 
districts that are facing greater financial constraints grow even 
more restrictive over the course of the Great Recession. This 
is shown in Figure 3 as well as in summary statistics in Table 
1 and the coefficients in Table 3
Specifically, school days/hours regulations in CBAs 
grew 0.036, or 40% of a pre-year SD, more restrictive in 
NBA than BA districts over the course of the recession 
(summary statistics, including standard deviations for the 
contract restrictiveness subareas, can be found in Table 1). 
This effect has meaningful implications for the kinds of 
policies negotiated into CBAs. For instance, a 40% SD 
change in school days and hours increases the probability 
that the average contract limits the teacher workday to less 
than 7 hours by nearly 20% or by 6 percentage points—
from 33% to 39%.6 Similarly, grievance procedures grew 
more restrictive post-recession by 0.043 units (33% of an 
SD) in NBA relative to BA districts. Nonteaching duty pro-
visions in CBAs increased in restrictiveness by 50% of an 
SD (0.055) in the financially strapped NBA districts rela-
tive to BA districts. Again, to place this into context, a 50% 
SD change in nonteaching duties increases the probability 
that the average contract places limits on the length and 
quantity of teacher meetings by 5%.
Together, the difference-in-difference analyses suggest 
that Non–Basic Aid districts experienced significant changes 
to the restrictiveness of their CBAs relative to the contracts 
of their less financially constrained counterparts in the after-
math of the recession.
How Do Teacher Salaries Change During Times of 
Recession-Induced Fiscal Constraint?
In times of fiscal duress, districts and unions must negoti-
ate over salaries in addition to working conditions and protec-
tions regulated by CBAs (Kober & Rentner, 2011). We saw 
previously that specific areas of CBAs become more restric-
tive to administrators when districts face severe financial 
hardships. In this section, we examine how teacher salaries 
change in districts suffering from greater fiscal constraint.
Results from our DiD models are presented in Table 4. 
We find that salaries in NBA districts decreased at both the 
TABLE 5
Fully Parameterized Difference-in-Difference Models Comparing Pupil-Teacher Ratios for Non–Basic Aid Versus Basic Aid Districts
Pupil-teacher ratio
(1)
Pre-recession Non–Basic Aid × 2003–2004 −0.702**
(0.236)
Non–Basic Aid × 2004–2005 −0.484*
(0.189)
Non–Basic Aid × 2005–2006 = reference  
Non–Basic Aid × 2006–2007 0.155
(0.153)
During recession Non–Basic Aid × 2007–2008 −0.102
(0.256)
Non–Basic Aid × 2008–2009 0.264
(0.219)
Non–Basic Aid × 2009–2010 0.349
(0.339)
Non–Basic Aid × 2010–2011 0.873*
(0.354)
Post-recession Non–Basic Aid × 2011–2012 1.065***
(0.289)
Chi-squared test that pre-recession coefficients = 0 15.09**
Note. Provided are the dummied-out difference-in-difference estimates. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. Per pupil revenues and expenditures 
were inflation adjusted to 2012 dollars. The interaction between Non–Basic Aid and the year indicator in Column 1, Row 1, for example, is interpreted as 
the difference in the pupil-teacher ratio in 2003–2004 between Non–Basic Aid and Basic Aid districts, relative to the difference in 2005–2006. All mod-
els control for student enrollment (ln), the percentage of free and reduced-price lunch students, district location (urban, rural, suburban), and district type 
(elementary district, high school district, unified district).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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bottom and top of the salary schedule and the average salary 
returns to experience decreased over the course of the reces-
sion relative to teacher salaries and experience returns in BA 
districts. However, these relationships are only statistically 
significant (p < .01) for novice teacher entering teaching at 
the base level of the salary schedule. This reinforces predic-
tions that unions may bargain in the interests of their more 
senior teachers, reducing base salaries before negotiating 
reductions for veterans.
How Do Pupil-Teacher Ratios Change During Times of 
Recession-Induced Fiscal Constraint?
Table 5 (Column 1) shows our results from our event 
study (Equation 4). We find that pupil-teacher ratios in NBA 
FIGURE 3. Trends in subarea restrictiveness.
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districts increased steadily over time, and in the 2010–2011 
(during recession) and 2011–2012 (post-recession) years, 
pupil-teacher ratios in NBA districts were 0.87 and 1.07 stu-
dents per teacher larger than in 2005–2006, respectively.
Figure 4 and Table 5 also provide some evidence of pre-
recession trends in pupil-teacher ratios for NBA relative to 
BA districts. Although Figure 4, which shows unadjusted 
trends in pupil-teacher ratios for NBA versus BA districts 
since the 2003–2004 school year, suggests that both NBA 
and BA pupil-teacher ratios began to decline in the 2003–
2004 school year, with BA ratios declining at a faster rate, 
the event study results shown in Table 5 show that in fact, 
once we have adjusted for the set of covariates discussed in 
the “Data” and “Methods” sections, NBA pupil-teacher 
ratios were decreasing at a significantly faster rate than in 
comparison Basic Aid districts. As is shown in the bottom of 
Table 5, we reject the null hypothesis on the chi-square test 
that the pre-recession trends are equivalent (p < .01). Given 
that the pre-recession trends suggest movement in the oppo-
site direction of our post-recession treatment effect, our 
observed effect may be biased downward but not upward. 
Consequently, we may be underestimating the positive 
impact of the recession on pupil-teacher ratios in NBA rela-
tive to BA districts.
Conclusion
There are few forces more important, and perhaps more 
controversial, in the provision of public education than 
teachers’ unions and their collective bargaining rights and 
the financing of K–12 schools. This article examines the 
interaction of the two; we assess how the CBAs negotiated 
between teachers’ unions and local school district adminis-
trators change during times of severe fiscal constraint, as 
evidenced by the Great Recession.
We find that school districts and teachers’ unions make 
changes to key instructional resources during times of fiscal 
constraint in ways that may not benefit students. We find 
suggestive evidence that unions and administrators negoti-
ated increased class sizes and decreased instructional hours 
in financially constrained districts. This is in addition to cuts 
to teacher salaries, which may not have short-term effects on 
instruction but serve as one of the most important working 
conditions for teachers. In compensation for these changes, 
we find some evidence that teachers’ unions “traded” for 
nonpecuniary contract language that increased the restric-
tiveness of union contracts in key areas, namely, nonteach-
ing duties and grievance procedures. These policy subareas 
do not directly impact districts’ bottom lines but likely do 
constrain administrators’ flexibility in tackling important 
educational problems. For instance, more restrictive non-
teaching duties provisions might make it such that districts 
cannot ask teachers to come to extra professional develop-
ment meetings or cannot schedule faculty meetings to 
address problems of practice. They might require that 
administrators provide more duty-free time to teachers and/
or reduce their expected contributions to oversight of after-
school activities (adjunct duties). Similarly, grievance sub-
area restrictiveness suggests that administrators have less 
flexibility to address disagreements between teachers and 
FIGURE 4. Trends in pupil-teacher ratios.
Note. The vertical dashed lines show the beginning and ending years of the recession (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).
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administrators and that these disagreements last longer and 
take more teacher and administrator time to resolve.
Together, these findings have implications for how teach-
ers’ unions and schools district navigate periods of financial 
strain in the future. Although the degree of financial duress 
faced by school districts during the Great Recession was 
unprecedented, financial struggles are not a thing of the past. 
As districts work to balance growing pension liabilities with 
ongoing operational needs, navigate cyclical recessionary 
patterns, see their enrollments decline, and experience com-
petitive pressures from alternative schooling options such as 
charter schools, most if not all public school districts in the 
United States will face mounting fiscal pressure (Arsen, 
DeLuca, Ni, & Bates, 2015; Bifulco & Reback, 2014; Dolan, 
2016; EdSource, 2012; Favot, 2016; Shaffer, 2016). School 
district administrators may turn to their CBAs to both main-
tain key instructional resources, like class sizes and instruc-
tional hours, and generate financial flexibility in other areas 
like teacher compensation. Because it’s unlikely that admin-
istrators will be able to secure this flexibility without com-
pensating teachers in some other way, they may have to 
increase the restrictiveness of contract language in nonpecu-
niary contracts areas like teacher transfers and grievances. 
While these policies may enhance teacher working condi-
tions, they also may make it more difficult for administrators 
to flexibly operate their districts to address the needs of their 
students and schools.
We also hope that this study helps pave the way for addi-
tional research on the intricacies of collective bargaining in 
an era of changing union power. Our study suggests that cuts 
to CBAs during a large fiscal shock were not unilaterally 
beneficial for students, or school districts, or teachers’ 
unions, thereby indicating that tradeoffs were made at the 
bargaining table. With the growing #RedforEd movement, 
teachers’ unions have been organizing strikes in states and 
cities across the country, demanding (and winning) higher 
salaries, smaller class sizes, and additional support staff. 
This showcase of union bargaining power is likely, in part, a 
response to the recent Supreme Court ruling in Janus vs. The 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (2018), which prohibited the collection of “fair 
share” fees from nonunion public sector employees for the 
cost of union bargaining services. As a result, our under-
standing of the implications of teachers’ union power, espe-
cially in contract negotiations, may need to be updated even 
further. We are aware that there are similar data on CBA con-
tent available in states outside of California. Further work in 
a similar vein can help assess the degree to which our results 
are generalizable outside of California and the Great 
Recession. Moreover, we believe that there is a need for 
qualitative work that can get inside the negotiations as they 
are underway to assess why administrators and unions make 
the decisions they do at the bargaining table. Such empirical 
evidence will help inform both theory and practice.
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Notes
1. We generate Figure 2 based on our sample of 406 school 
districts in California with four or more schools with collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) data from the 2005–2006 and 2011–
2012 school years. The figure compares 22 Basic Aid (BA) dis-
tricts (defined in 2005–2006) to the main sample of 384 Non–Basic 
Aid (NBA) school districts (blue). Revenue values are inflation-
adjusted. Figures using the complete set of data on California 
districts look substantially the same and are available on request. 
Figure 2 suggests that revenues are lower than expenditures. This 
is because the NCES data set used in our analyses excludes from 
its definition of revenue a set of financing sources available to 
districts but not officially accounted as revenue by the California 
Department of Education (e.g., emergency apportionments, pro-
ceeds from sale or lease purchase of land and buildings, etc.). When 
we adjust the definition of revenue using California’s Standardized 
Accounting Code Structure financial data, our results are the same. 
Available from the authors on request.
2. The data for this article come from a data set of negotiated 
CBAs between school districts and teachers’ unions in California 
in place during the 2005–2006 and 2011–2012 school years. CBAs 
are generally renegotiated every 3 years, although not all districts 
are able to reach new contract agreements within the required 
3-year timeframe. These districts roll over their existing contracts 
unchanged from the previous negotiation cycle. These CBAs are 
included in the database even if the contract is identical to what 
was collected in the previous round of data collection because these 
CBAs still govern school and district operations in the absence of 
new contracts. This impacts very few of the CBAs in our sample: 
fewer than 2% of districts had the same CBAs in place between 
2005–2006 and 2011–2012.
3. In particular, many contract policies (e.g., teacher transfer and 
grievance provisions) do not affect districts with only a few schools 
or affect them to a much lesser extent. For example, which teachers 
receive priority for voluntary transfer decision is less important in 
school districts with only one or two schools than in larger school 
districts because there are fewer transfer options.
4. In total, our set of contracts contains 466 (80%) of California 
school district contracts from the 2005–2006 school year and 487 
(83%) from the 2011–2012 school year. The longitudinal sample 
contains CBAs for 406 school districts collected in 2005–2006 
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and 2011–2012, which represents 73% of the total population of 
California districts with four or more schools in both years. To 
examine whether missing data may bias our results, we regress 
an indicator that equals 1 if the district is missing from our pre- or 
post-sample on our set of observable covariates. These results are 
presented in online Appendix Table D1. We find very few observ-
able differences between sampled and missing BA districts in either 
the pre- or post-recession years. The only significant difference is 
in the post-year, when missing BA districts have a slightly higher 
probability of being rural. In the pre-year, we also see few signifi-
cant differences between missing and nonmissing NBA districts. 
Missing NBA districts are more likely to be rural and have fewer 
Asian students. In the post-recession year, missing NBA districts 
are more likely to be rural and significantly less likely to be in urban 
or suburban locations. In addition, they have higher proportions of 
low-income and White students and lower proportions of Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian students. They are also significantly smaller. 
Note that in California, rural districts are smaller and have higher 
proportions of White and low-income students than their urban 
counterparts. All of these factors substantiate our hypothesis that 
CBAs missing from our sample result from smaller central office 
staffs that constrain their ability to respond to public data requests 
or post documents to websites. In other words, the failure of districts 
to respond to our request for CBAs or post them on their website 
is likely not associated with the strength of the teachers’ union or 
the district or union’s likelihood of negotiating more or less flexible 
contracts independent of their size. Nonetheless, given these differ-
ences in the post-year for NBA districts, we note that our sample of 
districts with four or more schools is not necessarily representative 
of the population of districts with four or more schools in California.
5. We also include 2008–2009 CBA data in the generation of 
these partial independence item response (PIIR) measures. We do 
not include 2008–2009 CBA restrictiveness measures in our analy-
sis because it is unclear if this year should be classified as a pre-
treatment or a treatment year. Presumably, the CBAs negotiated 
to be in effect in the 2008–2009 school year were negotiated by 
summer 2008 but really any time in the 3 years before summer 
2008 (so, as early as summer 2005). This suggests that it is more 
likely that these CBAs are from pretreatment years. However, at 
least some of them may have been negotiated during the recession, 
in the summer of 2008. As such, we focus our analysis on CBAs 
that were negotiated before the recession (in place by 2005–2006) 
compared to those that were negotiated either during or after the 
recession (in place by 2011–2012). The inclusion of the 2008–2009 
CBAs in the generation of the PIIR measure should not bias our 
results as it simply lends more information to the generation of the 
relative restrictiveness measure for each district in each year.
6. The conditional severities ( γk ) from the PIIR model cap-
ture the value of contract restrictiveness at which a given item 
has 0.5 likelihood of appearing in a contract. The severities 
are easily converted into conditional probabilities at a given 
level of contract restrictiveness using the following formula: 
ϕ γ γk k ks s= +( ) −( ) + +( ) −( )exp x x/ ( exp )1 , where γk  repre-
sents the conditional severity of the item and x  and s  are con-
stants that represent the sample mean and standard deviation of 
contract restrictiveness. We can further convert the conditional 
probabilities into marginal probabilities by multiplying the condi-
tional probability of a given item by the conditional probabilities 
of its gate items. The resulting marginal probability tells us the 
probability of a given item appearing in a contract at a given level 
of contract restrictiveness.
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